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Abstract
We address the challenge of designing optimal adversarial noise algorithms for
settings where a learner has access to multiple classifiers. We demonstrate how
this problem can be framed as finding strategies at equilibrium in a two-player,
zero-sum game between a learner and an adversary. In doing so, we illustrate
the need for randomization in adversarial attacks. In order to compute Nash
equilibrium, our main technical focus is on the design of best response oracles
that can then be implemented within a Multiplicative Weights Update framework
to boost deterministic perturbations against a set of models into optimal mixed
strategies. We demonstrate the practical effectiveness of our approach on a series
of image classification tasks using both linear classifiers and deep neural networks.
1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing concern regarding the sensitivity of learning algorithms
to noise and their general stability. State-of-the-art classifiers that achieve or even surpass human
level performance can be reliably fooled by perturbing inputs with an imperceptible amount of
noise [7, 12, 22, 31]. To evaluate classifiers’ robustness and improve their reliability, the study of
adversarial noise has become a central focus in machine learning [14, 16, 17, 25, 26, 30].
One of the most active areas of research within adversarial noise, has been the design of adversarial
attacks against a single classifier (e.g. [5, 7, 12, 22, 23, 31]). Given a data point and a classifier, the
goal of these algorithms is to find the perturbation of minimum norm that, when added to the data,
induces the classifier to make the wrong prediction. Adversarial attacks have gained a great deal of
attention as they inform the design of robust models and test the robustness of existing models.
A common strategy for robust classification is to randomize decisions across multiple classifiers. This
approach is used in gradient boosting [10, 11] as well as for boosting linear classifiers [2] and neural
networks [6]. An attack designed to fool a single model as in [5, 7, 12, 22, 23, 31] may do poorly on
another model and therefore randomizing between models is a reasonable defense strategy.
In this paper, we study adversarial attacks against a learner that randomizes between multiple
classifiers. In particular, we consider the design of provably optimal adversarial attacks against a set
of classifiers. Relative to attacks against a single classifier, characterizing the optimal attack against
multiple classifiers is significantly more challenging. Classifiers that achieve the same accuracy
can have drastically different decision boundaries. Hence, a perturbation that fools one model may
be completely ineffective on another (See example in Figure 1). Heuristically, one may design an
attack on the average of multiple classifiers, yet such an attack does may be arbitrarily ineffective.
We therefore consider a robust optimization approach and define an optimal attack against a set of
classifiers as noise that minimizes the maximum accuracy of all classifiers in that set.
We present a principled approach for attacking a set of classifiers which proves to be highly effective
for both linear models and deep neural networks. We show that constructing optimal attacks against
multiple classifiers is equivalent to finding strategies at equilibrium in a zero-sum game between a
learner who selects classifiers from a set, and an adversary that adds (bounded) noise to data points.
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Figure 1: Starting on the left, the optimal attack against a single classifier consists of finding a noise
vector that pushes the point past the decision boundary. In the case of multiple classifiers, while we
can sometimes find perturbations that fool all classifiers simultaneously as seen in (c), attacks that
fool one classifier may be ineffective on others. Hence, we must randomize across noise vectors to
generate robust attacks as in (b). In (d), we see how this phenomenon extends to nonlinear classifiers.
Contributions. It is well known that the Nash equilibria of zero-sum games can be efficiently
obtained by applying the celebrated Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm, if there exists an oracle
that computes a best response to a randomized strategy [8, 9, 15]. The main technical challenge we
address pertains to the design and implementation of these best response oracles in the context of
adversarial noise. More generally, our contributions are as follows:
• We show how computing optimal attacks against multiple classifiers can be reduced to the
task of designing best response oracles within the MWU framework (Section 2);
• We provide a geometric characterization of the optimization problem of finding best re-
sponses for a general set of classifiers and demonstrate how to construct an exact oracle via
convex optimization for the case when the set consists of linear classifiers (Section 3);
• We show that when the number of classifiers is super-constant in the dimension of the data,
constructing an optimal attack is in general NP-hard even for binary linear classifiers. To
address this, we design a convex relaxation and prove it is guaranteed to return a solution
arbitrarily close to optimal in polynomial time under natural conditions (Section 4);
• We generalize our approach to neural networks (Section 5) and empirically validate the
efficacy of this principled approach via a series of image classification experiments. We
demonstrate how there is a large gap in performance between our methods and existing
state-of-the-art approaches when attacking a set of classifiers (Section 6).
Similar to most work on adversarial noise (e.g. [5, 7, 12, 22, 23, 31]), we assume that the attacker
has full knowledge of the classifiers being attacked. From the perspective of informing the design of
robust classifiers, this is an important assumption to make if we wish to certify the robustness of a
learning strategy against a worst case adversary. Practically speaking, this is a sensible consideration
since practitioners often use off-the-shelf classifiers that are accessible to attackers. For many
sophisticated machine learning tasks, training state-of-the-art classifiers, such as neural networks, is
an expensive endeavor which requires significant experience and tuning. Instead of training their own
models, it has become increasingly common for practitioners to make use of pre-trained classifiers
that are available online. Most importantly however, the design of optimal attacks against a set of
classifiers is a basic theoretical question in robust machine learning that so far has not been addressed.
Related Work. Our work builds upon a rich literature of adversarial noise and robust optimization
in machine learning [4, 20, 24, 27, 28, 31]. More specifically, our results on designing attacks that
robustly optimize over a set of classifiers can be seen as complementary to that of Chen et al. [6]. In
their paper, they demonstrate how given a Bayesian oracle that returns an ε-approximate solution
for distributions over a set of objectives, one can then compute a distribution over solutions that
is ε-approximate in the worst case. While they abstract away the optimization problem into the
existence of an oracle, our main focus is precisely the design of efficient algorithms to compute best
responses in the context of adversarial noise. Within the security literature, Liu et al. [19] motivate
the use of ensembles as a heuristic approach to attack deep learning classifiers in the context of black
box attacks. Yet, the problem setting they consider is significantly different since they are interested
in attacking a single unknown classifier rather that robustly optimizing over an entire set.
2
2 Optimal Attacks against a Set of Classifiers are a Zero-Sum Game
To simplify our presentation, we describe the optimal attack on a single point (x, y) ∈ Rd × [k],
where Rd is the input space and [k] is the set of labels. This is without loss of generality since
each point in a data set {(xj , yj)}mj=1 can be perturbed independently, and the optimal attack on
{(xj , yj)}mj=1 consists of the m optimal attacks on each point individually.
A deterministic adversarial attack is a single vector v ∈ Rd. A distribution q is a randomized
adversarial attack if q is a probability distribution over a set of deterministic attacks {v1, . . . , vt}.
We say that an attack is ε-bounded if all vectors vi that have non-zero probability under q have
bounded norm, i.e. ||vi||p ≤ ε. We describe the case for the `2 norm, however, our results can be
easily extended to a variety of norms, including the `∞ norm (see Appendix D.3).
For a given classifier c : Rd → [k], a deterministic adversarial attack v induces misclassification on
(x, y) if c(x+ v) 6= y. Given a finite set of n classifiers C, an optimal adversarial attack on a pair
(x, y) is a distribution q over noise vectors that maximizes the minimum 0-1 loss of the models in C:
arg max
q
min
c∈C Ev∼q
[`0-1(c, x+ v, y)] (1)
This objective describes the optimal adversarial attack because it has the property that the adversary
is indifferent as to the classifier chosen by the learner. As we later illustrate both empirically and
theoretically, designing attacks against classifiers that are chosen uniformly at random, or even the
ensemble of all models, provides no guarantees that there exists a classifier in the set which achieves
perfect accuracy. Therefore, the optimal attack for an adversary which faces uncertainty as to the
classifier ultimately chosen over the learner is to robustly optimize over the entire set of possibilities.
Optimal attacks are equilibrium strategies. Attacking a set of classifiers can be modeled as a
zero-sum game between a learner who selects classifiers c ∈ C and an adversary that chooses
noise vectors v ∈ Rd, where ||v||2 ≤ ε. In addition to pure strategies, players can opt to play
randomized strategies. The learner can choose a distribution p over the set C and the adversary can
select an ε-bounded randomized attack q. Randomization is a necessary property of the model since
deterministic attacks are limited in their power to induce misclassification across multiple classifiers
as seen in Figure 1. As mentioned previously, the game is played over a single example (x, y). We
define the payout function of the game M0-1(p,q) as the expected 0-1 loss of the learner:1
M0-1(p,q)
def
= E
c∼p,v∼q
[`0-1(c, x+ v, y)] (2)
In this presentation, the learner tries to minimize payouts while the adversary maximizes. The Nash
equilibrium of the game is a pair of strategies p?,q? such that the following relationship holds:
min
c∈C
M0-1(c,q
?) = max
v∈Rd
M0-1(p
?, v) = λ (3)
Computing optimal adversarial attacks via MWU. Since the seminal result of Freund and
Shapire [8, 9], it is well known that Multiplicative Weight Updates as described in Algorithm 1
can be used to efficiently compute equilibrium strategies of zero-sum games assuming access to
a best response oracle that returns the optimal pure strategy (best deterministic attack) for any
distribution over C. The main focus of our paper is how to design such best response oracles that
enable the implementation of MWU and in doing so allow us to compute optimal attacks.
BEST RESPONSE(p, ε,M`)
def
= arg max
v∈Rd, ||v||2≤ε
M`(p, v) (4)
The MWU algorithm computes distributions p?,q? that are within δ of the equilibrium value of the
game λ = minp maxq M0-1(p,q) using O( lnnδ2 ) iterations. 2 In this work, we focus on developing
attacks on sets of neural networks and linear models. However, our framework can be used to generate
optimal attacks for any domain in which one can approximate a best response.
1Later on, we modify the game so that it is played over other loss functions. Hence, while M0-1 denotes
the expected loss of the learner under the 0-1 loss, we let M` denote the expected loss of the learner under an
arbitrary loss function `. We overload notation so that the payoff function M`(·, ·) accepts distributions p,q as
well as pure strategies c ∈ C, v ∈ Rd.
2In practice, the algorithm converges in far fewer iterations as we show through our experiments in Section
6. We analyze the convergence of the MWU algorithm in Appendix C.
3
Algorithm 1: Multiplicative Weight Updates for Optimal Noise
Input: C = {ci}ni=i, point (x, y), parameters ε, T , β, payoff function M`(·, ·)
initialize p1 = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n );
for t = 1 to T do
Set vt = BEST RESPONSE(pt, ε,M`)
Set pt+1[i] ∝ pt[i](1− β)M`(ci,vt) for every i ∈ [n]
end for
Return: uniform distributions p? over {p1, . . . ,pT }, q? over {v1, . . . , vT }
3 Designing Best Response Oracles for Adversarial Attacks
In this section we present our main technical results: the characterization and implementation of
best response oracles for adversarial noise. We begin by characterizing the optimization problem
for a general set of classifiers under the 0-1 loss. Then, we provide a more refined analysis of the
underlying geometry for the case where the set C is composed of linear models. This refined analysis
is the fundamental insight that guides the design of algorithms for optimal attacks. Lastly, we present
the central result of the section, the existence of an exact best response oracle for linear classifiers.
Geometry of best response oracles. The key observation that allows for the design of best response
oracles is that the optimization problem described in Equation 4 can be solved by searching over
finitely many regions. When the learner selects a distribution over a finite set of classifiers, her loss
M0-1(p, ·) can only assume finitely many values, each of which is associated with a particular region
Tj ⊂ Rd. Finding the optimal response then consists of finding points in each region and choosing
the one with the highest associated loss.
Lemma 1. Given a point (x, y) ∈ Rd × [k], selecting a distribution p over a set C of n classifiers
partitions the input space Rd into kn disjoint sets Tj such that:
1. For each Tj , there exists a unique label vector sj ∈ [k]n such that for all v with x+ v ∈ Tj
and ci ∈ C, ci(x+ v) = sj,i, where sj,i is a particular label in [k].
2. There exists a finite set of numbers a1, . . . akn , not necessarily all unique, such that
M0-1(p, v) = aj for all noise vectors v such that x+ v ∈ Tj .
Proof. We define each set Tj according to the predictions of the classifiers ci ∈ C on the perturbed
points x+ v that lie within Tj . In particular, each region Tj is associated with a unique label vector
sj ∈ [k]n such that ci(x+ v) = sj,i for all ci ∈ C. This relationship defines a bijection between sets
Tj and label vectors sj . Since the predictions of each model are the same for all points in a particular
set, the expected loss M0-1(p, v)=
∑
i∈[n] p[i]`0-1(ci, x+ v, y) is constant for all points x+ v that lie
in that set. Since there are finitely many regions, the loss can only assume finitely many values.
Lemma 1 shows that if we can design an algorithm to find points in each region Tj , we can compute
a best response. Next, we show that the design of such an algorithm relies crucially on the geometry
induced by the classifiers we wish to attack. In particular, when the set of classifiers consists of linear
models, the regions Tj are not only finite, they have the added benefit of also being convex.
Lemma 2. (Informal) Given a point (x, y) ∈ Rd × [k] selecting a distribution p over a set C of n
linear classifiers, partitions the input space Rd into kn disjoint and convex sets Tj .
This insight allows us to compute best responses via a reduction to convex programming as we
present in Theorem 1. The proof, presented in the Appendix, introduces the construction of an
exact algorithm to find points in each region Tj . Having found a vector associated with each region,
computing a best response then amounts to selecting the perturbation associated with the highest loss.
Theorem 1. For linear classifiers, implementing an exact best response oracle reduces to the problem
of minimizing a quadratic function over a set of kn convex polytopes.
4 Computing Optimal Attacks Efficiently
The previous section introduced the key geometric insights necessary to compute best responses. We
now analyze the complexity of computing an optimal attack on a set of classifiers in various settings.
We show that computing the optimal attack can be done efficiently when the number of classifiers is
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constant in the input dimension. In general, however, we show that the problem of designing optimal
attacks is NP-hard. We address this challenge by developing a novel algorithmic approach that is
based on convex relaxations and is guaranteed to return the optimal solution under natural conditions.
Computing optimal attacks efficiently. For sufficiently rich data distributions, only a small number
of classifiers can perform reasonably well. This assumption is typical within the adversarial examples
literature [1, 7, 13, 19, 32] where most of the settings considered suppose that the learner has access
only to a small constant number of classifiers (e.g less than 5). For these settings, when the number
of classifiers is constant, a best response is computable in polynomial time.
Corollary 1. When the number of linear classifiers is constant in the size of the input dimension d,
the optimal attack on a set of classifiers can be computed in polynomial time.
The main idea of the proof is that for a constant number of classifiers r, computing a best response as
per Theorem 1 requires searching over only polynomially many regions Tj . Since MWU takes only
polynomially many iterations to converge to a solution, we can compute an optimal attack efficiently.
Hardness of computing best responses. If the number of classifiers is superconstant, designing an
efficient algorithm to compute the optimal best response is NP-hard, even for binary linear models.
Theorem 2. Given a set C of n linear binary classifiers, a number B, a point (x, y), a noise budget
α, and a distribution p, the problem of finding a vector v with ||v||2 ≤ α such that the loss of the
learner M0-1(p, v) = B is NP-complete.
The proof relies on the geometric characterization developed in Section 3 and is deferred to the
Appendix. Given the hardness of computing best responses, we now develop an appropriate convex
relaxation of the problem and introduce an alternative optimization method using projected gradient
descent. Furthermore, we identify a set of natural conditions under which this new approach is
guaranteed to return the optimal best response.
4.1 Best Responses via Convex Relaxations
Computing a best response to multiple classifiers is hard when the number of classifiers is super-
constant, since for any given ε > 0 we can construct instances where no ε-perturbation can succeed
in fooling all classifiers. In such a case, our reduction implies that no known algorithm can do better
than exhaustively searching over exponentially-many intersections of decision boundaries. But if a
region where all classifiers are fooled within the noise budget exists – and our experiments show that
this is often the case – we can efficiently find near optimal solutions using a convex relaxation.
To describe this approach, recall from our characterization in Section 3, that computing a best
response is equivalent to searching over a finite number of regions Tj , each defined according to the
underlying predictions of the learner’s classifiers on points in the set. For a given point (x, y) and
noise budget ε, we say that a region Tj is a feasible misclassification set if there exists a noise vector
v s.t. ||v||2 ≤ ε and x+ v ∈ Tj but ci(x+ v) 6= y for all ci ∈ C. Figure 1 (c) illustrates a feasible
misclassification set – a region inside the noise budget where all classifiers predict the wrong label.
Our main algorithmic approach to compute best responses for a super-constant number of classifiers
is to apply projected gradient descent to a weighted sum of appropriately chosen loss functions.
For binary classifiers ci, with labels in {±1}, predictions are made according to the rule: ci(x) =
sign(〈wi, x〉+ bi). Given a point (x, y) and a distribution p selected by the learner, we attempt to
solve the optimization problem outlined in (4) by running PGD on a weighted sum of reverse hinge
losses, f(v) =
∑n
i=1 p[i]`r(ci, x+ v, y), over v in the `2 ball of radius ε. The reverse hinge loss has
the property that it is 0 if and only if x+ v is misclassified by the classifier ci.3 We now prove that
such an approach computes the optimal best response if a feasible misclassification set exists:
`r(ci, x+ v, y)
def
= max{y(〈wi, x+ v〉+ bi), 0} (5)
Theorem 3. For any noise budget ε > 0, precision parameter δ > 0, and distribution p over C,
running projected gradient descent for O(ε2/δ2) iterations on f(v) = ∑ni=1 p[i]`r(ci, x + v, y)
returns a solution vt such that f(vt)−f(v?) ≤ δ, where v? is the global minimum of f . Furthermore,
if there exists a feasible misclassification set under ε, then it also holds that f(vt) − f(vBR) ≤ δ,
where vBR = BEST RESPONSE(p, ε,M0-1)
3To preserve the guarantees of MWU, we slightly modify the reverse hinge loss so that its range is constrained
to lie in the interval [0,1] by multiplying by a constant. See proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix for details.
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In our experiments, we build upon this theoretical result and verify that this method of approximating
best responses is effective even in cases where no feasible misclassification set exists. Moreover,
given that it returns the optimal solution in the convex case, it serves as a well-principled approach
for extending our framework to settings where the optimization problem is nonconvex.
5 Attacking a Set of Neural Networks
When the learner’s set of classifiers consists of neural networks, computing a best response for the
adversary still involves a search over finitely many regions Tj as per Lemma 2. However, given their
nonlinear decision boundaries, designing an exact algorithm to find the perturbation v of minimum
norm such that a point x+ v lies in a particular Tj is intractable since the regions are now nonconvex.
To compute best responses for this domain, we follow the same pattern as in the previous section and
design algorithms by solving a surrogate optimization problem which is computationally efficient
and whose analog in the convex setting is guaranteed to be optimal. In particular, we approximate a
best response on a set of neural networks by running projected gradient descent on a weighted sum
f(v) =
∑n
i=1 p[i]`ut(ci, x+ v, y) of untargeted reverse hinge losses, `ut.
4 For a neural network ci
and input x, we define ci,j(x) to the be jth logit of the classifier. Predictions are made according to
the rule: ci(x) = arg maxj ci,j(x).
`ut(ci, x+ v, y)
def
= max
{
2(
1
1 + e−z
− .5), 0}; z def= ci,y(x+ v)−max
j 6=y
ci,j(x+ v) (6)
We compute attacks on a set of neural networks via Algorithm 1 by relaxing the game to be played
using the payout function Mut which we define below. Since the untargeted reverse hinge loss is
bounded to [0,1], and is 0 if and only if the point x+ v is misclassified, running PGD on a weighted
sum of reverse hinge losses can then be seen as attempting to maximize the function Mut(p, ·).
Mut(p,q)
def
= 1− E
v∼q,c∼p
[`ut(c, x+ v, y)] (7)
Although we cannot prove guarantees in the deep learning case, this method directly generalizes
ideas we showed were optimal in the linear setting. Like other works that follow this design principle
[21, 22], we find that our principled algorithm yields state-of-the-art results in practice.
6 Experiments
We evaluate our framework for optimal attacks on a series of image classification tasks. First, we
validate our theory for linear classifiers by considering both binary and multiclass experiments on
MNIST. Afterwards, we evaluate our approach on ImageNet using deep neural networks. In both
cases, we see how our algorithms significantly outperform current methods.
Evaluation metrics. As per our discussion in Section 2, we evaluate attacks on a set of classifiers
according to the minimum 0-1 loss (maximum accuracy) they induce across the entire set. Given a
deterministic or randomized adversarial attack, q, we measure minci∈CM0-1(ci,q). We summarize
the strength of a noise algorithm across an entire data set by computing attacks individually for each
point and report the average minimum loss of the learner across all points. Lastly, to highlight the
difference between fooling classifiers on average and robustly optimizing across all models, we also
compute M0-1(p˜,q) where p˜ is the uniform distribution over C.
Baselines. We consider a variety of other methods with which to compare our approach. (i) Ensemble:
Given a set C, we ensemble ci ∈ C by averaging their predictions and attack the ensemble classifier as
a way of generating noise vectors that fool the underlying models; (ii) Best Individual: we generate
attacks for each model individually, evaluate them on the entire set, and choose the best one; (iii)
Oracle: we compute a best response to the uniform distribution over classifiers using the oracles we
introduce, but do not boost attacks by running MWU for multiple rounds.
6.1 Evaluating Optimal Attacks on Linear Classifiers
Experimental setup. For linear classifiers, we train two sets of 5 linear SVM classifiers on MNIST,
one for binary (digits 0 and 1) and another for multiclass (first 3 classes, MNIST 0-2). To ensure that
4We also use this approach to attack linear multiclass models. Given k classes, decisions are made according
to ci(x) = argmaxj∈[k] ci,j(x), where ci,j(x) = 〈wi,j , x〉+ bi,j
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Figure 2: Comparison of noise needed to induce similar misclassification across multiclass MNIST
classifiers. From left to right: Best Individual, Ensemble, Oracle, MWU-Oracle.
the decision boundaries are sufficiently different, we randomly zero out 75% of the dimensions of
the training set for each classifier. Hence, each model has weight parameters that are nonzero on a
random subset of features. All classifiers achieve test accuracies above 97%. For our experiments,
we randomly select 100 points from each test dataset that are correctly classified by all models.
Using our characterization, we can compute exact margins of each point to the decision boundary
(See Appendix for exact computation as well as further details on experimental setup). If we select a
noise budget ε smaller than the minimum margin, then it is impossible to induce any misclassification.
If ε is larger than the max margin, then feasible misclassification sets exist for all points and we are
guaranteed to fool all models as per Theorem 3. Hence, we select noise budgets in between the min
and max margin. In particular, we set ε to 2.3 and 1.3 for binary and multiclass, respectively.
We evaluate our framework for optimal noise by running MWU using both the exact oracle described
in Theorem 1 (MWU-Oracle) as well as the approximate oracle using PGD on a weighted sum of
losses (MWU-PGD). For binary models, MWU-PGD refers to running PGD for 40 iterations on a
sum of reverse hinge losses, while for multiclass, PGD is run on untargeted reverse hinge losses. For
the case of MWU-PGD, we compute noise solutions by running Algorithm 1 on the relaxed version
of the game with payoff function Mut (multiclass) and Mr (binary) as described in Section 5.5
To compute the baselines, since the class of linear models is convex, we compute an equal weights en-
semble by combining the weight vectors wi and biases bi for all ci ∈ C (e.g wensemble= 1n
∑n
i=1 wi).
We generate noise for the ensemble as well as for each individual model, by computing the theoreti-
cally optimal attack against a single linear classifier. This corresponds to the vector returned by the
exact best response oracle for when C consists of a single model, scaled to have `2 norm equal to ε.
Results. We present our results for multiclass in Table 1 and illustrate the convergence of MWU in
Figure 3. Results for binary classifiers are presented in the Appendix. First, we note that the Oracle
comparison, MWU-Oracle run for only a single iteration, does significantly better than all other
baselines. Since all classifiers have equal weights, this baseline finds the optimal deterministic attack,
that is the noise vector which induces misclassification across the largest subset of models.
Second, as seen in Figure 3, running MWU for several iterations significantly improves the quality of
the resulting noise. As per our theoretical analysis, the noise solution at the end of MWU constitutes
the optimal randomized attack, hence the difference in max accuracy between the first and last round
of MWU-Oracle indicates the exact gap between the optimal deterministic and randomized attack.
To further compare across methods, in Figure 2 we present the amount of distortion needed so
that each algorithm induces maximum accuracy across classifiers comparable to that induced by
MWU-Oracle. Since the classifiers have sparse features, noise generated against any individual
model is not effective in fooling other classifiers (entries are nonzero for on mostly disjoint set).
Therefore, the Best Individual baseline requires significantly more noise than other methods. To
match the performance of MWU-Oracle, the Ensemble baseline required 60% more noise, while
Oracle required only a 20% increase in the noise budget. We choose to present this comparison for
the MNIST case, since for ImageNet, the noise needed to fool classifiers cannot be visually perceived.
6.2 Robust Attacks against a Set of Neural Networks
Experimental setup. For deep learning, we downloaded 5 pretrained ImageNet models with different
architectures from the torchvision library: ResNet18, ResNet50, VGG13, VGG19 with batch norm,
5We add box constraints to the algorithms to ensure perturbed data points remain valid images in the range
[0,1]. See Appendix for further details on the experimental setup and update rule for projected gradient descent.
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Figure 3: Convergence of MWU for optimal attacks. For both MNIST multiclass models as well as
neural networks on ImageNet, running MWU for several iterations significantly boosts the quality of
adversarial noise. As seen in Table 1, our methods significantly outperform other approaches.
and DenseNet161.6 As before, we randomly select 100 images from the validation set that are
correctly classified by all models. While we can no longer precisely calculate margins for each point,
we choose noise budgets ε so that the perturbed images remain visually indistinguishable from the
originals as seen in Appendix A. In particular, we perform our experiments ε equal to 0.8.7
As discussed in Section 5, we compute attacks against neural networks by running Algorithm 1 using
the payout function Mut. We approximate best responses for this modified loss by running PGD for
40 iterations on a weighted sum of untargeted reverse hinge losses,
∑n
i=1 p[i]`ut(ci, x+ v, y). As
before, we clip solutions to the range [0, 1] so that they remain valid images.
For our baselines, we generate an ensemble classifier by computing an average over the logits of
different individual models. To generate adversarial examples against the ensemble as well as for
each individual model, we use the Momentum Iterative Method [7] which won first place in the NIPS
2017 Adversarial Attacks Competition [18]. In addition to experimenting with the hyper parameters
chosen by the authors in their original paper (t=5 iterations, decay factor µ=1, and step size of ε/T ),
we also search over neighboring values and report the best results.
Results. Our results for deep neural networks mimic those of linear classifiers and further demonstrate
how attacks developed for linear classifiers generalize well to deep learning. From Table 1, we see that
the gap between the best response based methods we introduce and the other baselines is significant.
As we motivate theoretically in Section 5, approximating a best response using PGD on a weighted
sum of untargeted reverse hinge losses results in a noise solution that significantly outperforms all
baselines by a large margin.
Running MWU-PGD for a single iteration, the Oracle baseline, results in a maximum accuracy of
36%. This demonstrates that, even without boosting our best response oracle can be used to generate
stronger attacks than existing approaches. If we do indeed boost noise using Multiplicative Weights,
then we can further improve the quality of noise by an additional 12% as seen in Figure 3. Lastly, we
highlight that the large gap between mean and max accuracies indicates that, in practice, there is a
significant difference between fooling classifiers on average vs robustly minimizing the maximum
accuracy. To properly attack a learner that randomizes across models, we must consider the latter.
Table 1: Results on linear multiclass models on MNIST (left) and deep networks on ImageNet (right).
Entries describe the mean and max accuracies of classifiers under a particular noise algorithm.
NOISE ALGORITHM MEAN MAX
ENSEMBLE 31.4% 55%
BEST INDIVIDUAL 80% 100%
ORACLE 12% 30%
MWU - PGD 34.6% 52%
MWU - ORACLE 13.4% 16.8%
NOISE ALGORITHM MEAN MAX
ENSEMBLE 26.2% 55%
BEST INDIVIDUAL 70.2% 99%
ORACLE 16.2% 36%
MWU - PGD 15.12 % 24.2%
6Model accuracies may be found on the pytorch website. Code for all experiments may be found here.
7If we divide ε by the input dimension (224x224x3), this amounts to around 5×10−6 per channel.
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"Robust Attacks against Multiple Classifiers"
Figure 4: Comparison of original and perturbed images from ImageNet under noise budget 0.8 in the
`2 norm. Perturbed images are on the right.
Guide to the Appendix
• In Appendix A, we present additional figures regarding the experiments on linear binary
classifiers as well as further details on our experimental setup.
• In Appendix B, we investigate, both empirically and theoretically, attacks on ensemble
classifiers and demonstrate why they underperform our methods.
• In Appendix C, we analyze the convergence of the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm
as a means of approximating Nash equilibrium strategies.
• In Appendix D, we present the remaining proofs from our geometric characterization of best
responses from Section 3. In particular, we present proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
• In Appendix E, we prove that computing best responses is NP-hard.
• In Appendix F, we prove Theorem 3, and show how projected gradient descent on a relaxed
version of the best response problem is guaranteed to return the optimal solution if a feasible
misclassification set exists.
• Lastly, we present the proof of Corollary 1 in Appendix G
A Additional Experiments
Having presented experimental results for deep learning and linear multiclass models in the main
body of the paper, in this section, we present our results on linear binary classifiers. Additionally, we
include further details on our experimental setup.
A.1 Further Details on Experimental Setup.
In Figure 2, we progressively increase the amount of noise for each attack until it induces a maximum
accuracy across classifiers that is comparable to the 16.8% induced by MWU-Oracle for multiclass
linear classifiers. Despite increasing the noise budget to 40 in the `2 norm, the Best Individual
baseline did not manage to reduce the max accuracy below 99%. This is explained by the fact that
classifiers are sparse and have dissimilar decision boundaries as explained in the main body of the
paper. For the Ensemble and Oracle baselines, similar levels of misclassification were achieved once
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Figure 5: Convergence of MWU on linear binary classifiers. Much like previous experiments for
multiclass models and deep learning, MWU converges quickly and significantly boosts the quality of
adversarial attacks.
we increased the noise budget to 2.1 and 1.57. Therefore, to achieve equal misclassification, we
needed to use 62% and 20% more noise, respectively.
As discussed in Section 4, to guarantee convergence of MWU, we need to ensure that losses are
constrained to the interval [0,1]. As previously defined, the reverse hinge loss can take values in
[0,∞). However, when computing best responses, noise vectors must lie inside the Euclidean ball of
radius ε. If we divide each individual loss by its maximum value over the `2 ball, we can guarantee
that losses are bounded to the interval [0, 1]. The max loss is straightforward to calculate. Since
pushing towards the boundary is the optimal attack, given a point (x, y) the reverse hinge loss is
maximized by pushing in the opposite direction (e.g x+ εy||w||2w). Dividing by the max loss amounts
to multiplying by a positive constant and thus preserves the convexity of the function.
To compute exact margins for linear classifiers, we use our exact oracle from Theorem 1. In particular,
given a single model c ∈ C and an example (x, y), there are only k − 1 regions Tj where points are
misclassified by the model. To compute the margin, the minimum distance from the point x to the
decision boundary, we can solve the convex program for the vector vj that pushes the point x into
each Tj , and compute the minimum length over all vectors vj .
When running projected gradient descent on a weighted sum of reverse hinge losses f(v) =∑n
i=1 p[i]`ut(ci, x+ v, y), we compute updates according to the rule:
vt+1 = Πε
(
vt − η · ∇f(vt)/||∇f(vt)||2
)
(8)
Where Πε is the projection operator onto the `2 ball of radius ε and η=1.25ε/T . We experimented
with using the traditional update rule vt+1 = Πε(vt − η∇f(vt)), for a small constant step size η
(e.g η = 0.1) and running for a larger number of iterations. However, we found that the practical
performance between the different approaches was negligible and hence opted for the one which
required fewer iterations.
Table 2: Experimental results on MNIST linear binary classifiers. As before, entries indicate the
mean and maximum accuracy of classifiers in the set when evaluated on a particular attack.
Noise Algorithm Mean Max
Best Individual 80% 100%
Ensemble 33.8% 65%
Oracle 12.8 % 34%
MWU - PGD 29.7% 42%
MWU - Oracle 13.6% 15%
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In addition to restricting vectors to the `2 ball, as mentioned previously, we enforce box constraints
so that each perturbed example remains a valid image. In particular, we clip iterates in PGD so that
x+ v ∈ [0, 1]d. In the case of the exact best response oracle, we augment the quadratic program with
constraints of the form 0 ≤ xi + vi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [d].
For all our our experiments, we ran the MWU algorithm for T=30 iterations and set the update
parameter β equal to
√
ln |C|/T as indicated by our theoretical analysis presented in Appendix C.
A.2 Experiment Results on Linear Binary Classifiers
Similar to our experiments for multiclass classifiers, we find that MWU equipped with the best
response oracle from Theorem 1 significantly outperforms all other baselines. Running the MWU
algorithm for several iterations in the case of the exact oracle greatly improves the quality of the
resulting noise solution. In particular, the gap between the Oracle baseline and MWU-Oracle indicates
that the maximum accuracy on the set of classifiers can be further reduced by an additional 20%
by considering the optimal randomized attack as seen in Table 2. For MWU-PGD, contrary to the
ImageNet case, we find that there is little benefit to boosting noise via MWU.
B Why Ensembles Fail at White Box Attacks
When asked to find a noise solution that affects the performance of multiple classifiers, a natural
approach one might consider is to attack the ensemble of all classifiers in that set. However, as we
have seen previously, attacks that fool an ensemble do not always fool the underlying models. While
ensembles have been shown to generate strong black box attacks [19], they seem to fail at generating
robust white box attacks. In this section, we illustrate why this is the case.
B.1 Understanding Ensemble Attacks Theoretically
To understand the shortcomings of attacks on ensemble classifiers, we begin by theoretically char-
acterizing their behavior on the simplest of settings: linear binary classifiers. Attacks on ensemble
classifiers, typically consist of applying gradient based optimization methods to an ensemble model
E(C,p) made up of classifiers ci ∈ C and ensemble weights p. For binary classifiers, this ensem-
ble classifier is computed by averaging the individual weight vectors as described in Section 6,
(wensemble= 1n
∑n
i=1 wi). To find adversarial examples, we run gradient descent on a loss function
such as the reverse hinge loss that is 0 if and only if the perturbed example x′ = x+ v with true label
y is misclassified by the model.
Assuming x′ is not yet misclassified by the ensemble, the gradient of the loss function
∇`r(E(C,p), x′, y) is equal to
∑
i p[i]wi. This is undesirable for two main reasons:
• First, the ensemble obscures valuable information about the underlying objective. If x′ is
misclassified by a particular model ci but not the ensemble, contrary to applying PGD on
a weighted sum of losses, ci still contributes p[i]wi to the gradient and biases exploration
away from promising regions of the search space;
• Second, fooling the ensemble does not guarantee that the noise will transfer across the
underlying models. Assuming the true label y is -1, `r(E(C,p), x′, y) = 0 if and only if
there exists a subset T ⊆ C such that:∑
ct∈T
p[t](〈wt, x′〉+ bt) > 0 (9)
∑
cj∈C\T
p[j](〈wj , x′〉+ bj) < 0 (10)
∑
ct∈T
p[t](〈wt, x′〉+ bt) >
∣∣ ∑
cj∈C\T
p[j](〈wj , x′〉+ bj)
∣∣ (11)
Hence, the strength of an ensemble classifier is only as good as its weakest weighted
majority.
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Figure 6: Saliency Maps for ImageNet Classifiers. At the top is the true image. First row: ResNet18,
ResNet50, VGG13. Second row: VGG19 with batch norm, DenseNet161, and the ensemble network.
B.2 Investigating Properties of Neural Network Ensembles using Saliency Maps
Showing that attacking the ensemble is suboptimal in the linear case provides strong motivation
as to why the method should perform poorly in the nonlinear case. However, to investigate this
phenomenon further, we analyze how the decision boundaries differ between the individual classifiers
and the ensemble network in the case of deep learning. Having different classification boundaries
implies that attacks on one model are unlikely to affect other models as illustrated in Figure 1.
We visualize the class boundaries of convolutional neural networks using the algorithm proposed by
Simonyan et al. [29] for generating saliency maps. The class saliency map indicates which features
(pixels) are most relevant in classifying an image to have a particular label. Therefore, they serve
as one way of understanding the decision boundary of a particular model by highlighting which
dimensions carry the highest weight.
Given an input image x, they are defined as ∂ci,j(x)/∂x where ci,j(x) is the jth logit of the network
ci. In the case of multichannel images, the value per pixel is defined as the maximum across all
channels so as to yield a single grayscale image. Furthermore, we use the smoothed version of the
saliency maps algorithm where derivatives are averaged over slightly perturbed inputs x′ = x+ v
where v is sampled from a zero-mean gaussian with small variance.
In Figure 6, we see that the class saliency maps for individual models exhibit significant diversity. The
ensemble of all 5 classifiers appears to contain information from all models, however, certain regions
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that are of central importance for individual models are relatively less prominent in the ensemble
saliency map. This observation is in line with our earlier analysis of how ensemble classifiers
obfuscate key information regarding the decision boundary of individual models.
C Analysis of Multiplicative Weight Updates for Zero-Sum Games
Theorem 4. Given an error parameter δ, after O( lnnδ2 ) iterations, Algorithm 1 returns distributions
p?, q? s.t:
min
ci∈C
M`(ci,q
?) ≥ λ− δ
max
v∈Rd, ||v||2≤ε
M`(p
?, v) ≤ λ+ δ
where λ = min
q
max
p
M`(p,q) is the value of the game .
Proof. The following analysis draws heavily upon the work of Freund and Schapire [8, 9], yet the
precise treatment follows that of Kale [15].
By guarantees of the Multiplicative Weights algorithm, we have that for any distribution p over C
with losses in [0, 1], for β ≤ 1/2 the following relationship holds (Corollary 1, Kale [15]):
T∑
t=1
M`(pt, vt) ≤ (1 + β)
T∑
i=1
M`(p, vt) +
lnn
β
If we divide by T , and note that M(p, v) ≤ 1, and M(pt, vt) ≥ λ for all t (due to oracle guarantees),
we have that for any distribution p:
λ? ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
M`(pt, vt) ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
M`(p, vt) + β +
lnn
βT
If we let p = p˜ be the optimal strategy for the min player, thenM`(p˜, v) ≤ λ? for any v. Furthermore,
if we set β = δ2 and T = d 4 lnnδ2 e we get that:
λ? ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
M`(pt, vt) ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
M`(p˜, vt) + δ ≤ λ? + δ
Therefore p?, the uniform distribution over p1, . . . ,pt is an approximately optimal solution for the
learner.
For the adversary, we know from the previous equations that the following holds for any strategy p
played by the learner:
λ? ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
M`(pt, vt) ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
M`(p, vt) + δ
If we set q? to be the distribution that assigns equal weight to vectors in the set {v1, . . . , vT } then we
have that for any distribution p:
λ? ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
M`(pt, vt) ≤M`(p,q?) + δ
Hence q? is an approximately optimal strategy:
λ? − δ ≤M`(p,q?)
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D Proofs of Geometric Characterization
In this section, we present the proofs of our theoretical results from Section 3 that were omitted from
the main body of the paper. In particular, we present the proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. Given a point, label pair (x, y) ∈ Rd × [k] selecting a distribution p over a set C of n
linear classifiers, partitions the input space Rd into kn disjoint and convex sets Tj . Furthermore,
Rd \⋃j Tj is a set of measure zero.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that the sets are disjoint since two sets Tj , Tj′ must differ in at least
one index and classifiers can only predict a single label for each point. To show that these sets are
convex, consider points x1, x2 ∈ Tj and an arbitrary classifier ci ∈ C s.t. ci(x) = z for all x ∈ Tj . If
we let x′ = αx1 + (1− α)x2 where α ∈ [0, 1] then the following holds for all j ∈ [k] where j 6= z:
ci,z(x
′) = 〈wi,z, αx1 + (1− α)x2〉+ bi,z
= α〈wi,z, x1〉+ αbi,z + (1− α)〈wi,z, x2〉+ (1− α)bi,z
> α〈wi,j , x1〉+ αbi,j + (1− α)〈wi,j , x2〉+ (1− α)bi,j
= ci,j(x
′)
Lastly, the set Rd \⋃i Ti is equal to the set of points x where there are ties for the maximum valued
classifier. This set is a subset of the set of points K that lie at the intersection of two hyperplanes:
Rd \
⋃
i
Ti ⊂ {x|∃ ci,k, cj,l s.t ci,k(x) = cj,l(x)} (12)
Finally, we argue that K has measure zero. For all ε > 0, x ∈ K, there exists an x′ such that
||x− x′||2 < ε and x′ /∈ K since the intersection of two distinct hyperplanes is of dimension two less
than the overall space. Therefore, Rd \⋃i Ti must also have measure zero.
D.1 Best Response Oracle for Linear Classifiers
For our analysis of Theorem 1, we focus on the case where C consists of “one-vs-all" classifiers. In
the following subsection, we show how our results can be generalized to other methods for multilabel
classification by reducing these other approaches to the “one-vs-all" case. Given k classes, a “one-vs-
all" classifier ci consists of k linear functions ci,j(x) = 〈wi,j , x〉+ bi,j where j ∈ [k]. On input x,
predictions are made according to the rule ci(x) = arg maxj ci,j(x).
Theorem 1. For linear classifiers, implementing an exact best response oracle reduces to the problem
of minimizing a quadratic function over a set of kn convex polytopes.
Proof. From the previous lemmas, we know that the expected loss of the learner, M0-1(p, ·), can
assume only finitely many values, each of which is associated with a particular convex region
Tj ⊂ Rd . Therefore, to compute a best response, we can iterate over all regions and choose the
perturbation with `2 norm less than ε that is associated with the region of highest loss. To find points
in a set Tj , each associated with label vector sj , we solve for the vector v of minimal `2 norm such
that x+ v ∈ Tj . This can be done by minimizing a quadratic function over a convex set:
min
v∈Rd
||v||22
subject to c1(x+ v) = sj,1
. . . .
cn(x+ v) = sj,n
(13)
Each constraint in the program above can be expressed as k − 1 linear inequalities. For a particular
z ∈ [k], ci ∈ C we write ci(x+ v) = z as ci,z(x+ v) > ci,j(x+ v) for all j 6= z.
D.2 Beyond “One-vs-All" Linear Classification
Here we extend the results from our analysis of linear classifiers to other methods for multilabel
classification. In particular, we show that any “all-pairs" or multivector model can be converted to an
equivalent “one-vs-all" classifier and hence all of our results also apply to these other approaches.
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All-Pairs. In the “all-pairs" approach, each linear classifier c consists of
(
k
2
)
linear predictors ci,j
trained to predict between labels i, j ∈ [k]. As per convention, we let ci,j(x) = −cj,i(x). Labels are
chosen according to the rule:
c(x) = arg max
i∈[k]
∑
j 6=i
ci,j(x)
Given an “all-pairs" model c, we show how it can be transformed into a “one-vs-all" model c′ such
that c(x)=c′(x) for all points x ∈ Rd:
c(x) = arg max
i∈[k]
∑
j 6=i
ci,j(x)
= arg max
i∈[k]
∑
j 6=i
〈wi,j , x〉+ bi,j
= arg max
i∈[k]
〈w′i, x〉+ b′i
= arg max
i∈[k]
∑
j 6=i
c′i(x) = c
′(x)
Multivector. Lastly, we extend our results to multilabel classification done via class-sensitive feature
mappings and the multivector construction by again reducing to the “one-vs-all" case. Given a
function Ψ : Rd × [k]→ Rn, labels are predicted according to the rule:
c(x) = arg max
y∈[k]
〈w,Ψ(x, y)〉 (14)
While there are several choices for the Ψ, we focus on the most common, the multivector construction:
Ψ(x, y) =
[
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈R(y−1)(d+1)
, x1, . . . , xn, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈Rd+1
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈R(k−y)(d+1)
]
w =
[
w1, . . . , wk
]
where wi ∈ Rd+1 ∀i
This in effect ensures that (14) becomes equivalent to that of the “one-vs-all" approach:
c(x) = arg max
i∈[k]
〈wi, x〉
D.3 Extensions to `∞ norm
While we focus on the `2 norm as the main metric with which to gauge the magnitude of adversarial
noise, our results can be readily extended to function with the `∞ norm. Most of our results follow
directly without modification, but for those that don’t we present extensions here:
For linear classifiers, we can extend the result of Theorem 1 for the case of the `∞ norm by slightly
modifying the convex program. Given a label vector sj and a point (x, y) we solve for:
min
v∈Rd
0
subject to ci(x+ v) = sj,i ∀i ∈ [k]
vi ≤ ε ∀i ∈ [d]
(15)
To extend our approximate best responses methods to the `∞ case, we can alter the projection step of
gradient descent to constrain noise to the `∞ ball. The solution space remains convex and hence our
theoretical guarantees still hold.
E Hardness of Computing a Best Response
Theorem 2. Given a set C of n linear binary classifiers, a number B, a point (x, y), noise budget ε,
and a distribution p, the problem of finding a vector v with ||v||2 ≤ ε such that the loss of the learner
M0-1(p, v) = B is NP-complete.
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Proof. We can certainly verify in polynomial time that a vector v induces a loss of B simply by
calculating the 0-1 loss of each classifier. Therefore the problem is in NP.
To show hardness, we reduce from Subset Sum. Given a set of n numbers P = {p1, . . . pn} and a
target number B, the goal of Subset Sum is to find a subset U ⊆ P such that the sum of the elements
in U equals B.8 Given an instance of Subset Sum, we determine our input space to be Rn, the point
x to be the origin, the label y = −1, and the noise budget ε = 1. Next, we create n binary classifiers
of the form ci(x) = 〈ei, x〉 where ei is the ith standard basis vector. We let pi be the probability with
which the learner selects classifier ci.9
We claim that there is a subset that sums to B if and only if there exists a region Tj ⊂ Rn on
which the learner achieves loss B. Given the parameters of the reduction, the loss of the learner is
determined by the sum of the probability weights of classifiers ci such that ci(x+ v) = +1 for points
x+ v ∈ Tj . If we again identify sets Tj with sign vectors sj ∈ {±1}n as per Lemma 1, there is a
bijection between the sets Tj and the power set of {p1, . . . , pn}. A number pi is in a subset Uj if the
ith entry of sj is equal to +1.
Lastly, we can check that there are feasible points within each set Tj and hence that all subsets within
the original Subset Sum instance are valid. Each Tj corresponds to a quadrant of Rn. For any ε > 0
and for any Tj , there exists a vj with `2 norm less than ε such that x+ vj ∈ Tj . Therefore, there is a
subset Uj that sums to B if and only if there is a region Tj in which the learner achieves loss equal to
B.
F Analysis of Projected Gradient Descent as a Best Response
Theorem 3. For any noise budget ε > 0, precision parameter β > 0, and distribution p over C,
running projected gradient descent for O(ε2/β2) iterations on f(v) = ∑ni=1 p[i]`r(ci, x + v, y)
returns a solution vt such that f(vt)−f(v?) ≤ β, where v? is the global minimum of f . Furthermore,
if there exists a feasible misclassification set under ε, then it also holds that f(vt)− f(vBR) ≤ β,
where vBR = BEST RESPONSE(p, ε,M0-1)
Proof. The reverse hinge loss is convex since it is the max of 0 and a linear function. The objective f
is thus also convex since it is a weighed sum of convex where all the weights are positive. In addition
to being convex, the function is also Lipschitz. To do show that it is Lipschitz, since the function is
convex, we only need to bound the norm of the gradient:
f(v2) ≥ f(v1) + 〈∇f(v1), v2 − v1〉
f(v1)-f(v2) ≤ 〈∇f(v1), v1-v2〉 ≤ ||∇f(v1)|| · ||v1-v2||
Reversing the roles of v1, v2 we get that:
f(v2)− f(v1) ≤ ||∇f(v2)|| · ||v2 − v1||
Therefore |f(v1) − f(v2)| ≤ L · ||v1 − v2|| where L is a bound on the norm of the gradient. The
objective function f(v) =
∑n
i=1 p[i] max{y(〈wi, x+ v〉+ bi), 0} has a max gradient of
n∑
i=1
p[i] · y · wi ≤
n∑
i=1
p[i]||wi||
Since all the classifiers are just hyperplanes, we can normalize all the wi to have norm 1. Furthermore,
since
∑n
i=1 p[i] = 1, we get that the max norm of the gradient is 1. Hence the function is 1 Lipschitz.
We can now apply standard theorems for the convergence of projected gradient descent for convex
Lipschitz functions. In particular, we use Theorem 3.2 from Bubeck [3] which states that for convex,
L-Lipschitz functions over the domain of a Euclidean ball with radius R, the following relationship
holds with respect to the global optimimum, v?:
f
( 1
T
T∑
t=1
vt
)
− f(v?) ≤ RL√
T
8Without loss of generality, we can assume that instances of Subset Sum only have values in the range [0, 1].
We can reduce from the more general case by simply normalizing inputs to lie in this range.
9We can again normalize values so that they form a valid probability distribution.
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To ensure that the average iterate is within β of the optimum, setting R = ε, L = 1 and solving
for T , we get that T must equal ε2/β2. Furthermore, if a feasible misclassification set exists, then
f(v?) = f(vBR) = 0 and we get that the average iterate must be within β of the optimal solution.
G Efficiently Computing Optimal Attacks against Sets of Constant Size
Corollary 1. When the number of linear classifiers is constant in the size of the input dimension d,
the best response strategy can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. When the number of classifiers is a small constant r, from Lemma 1 it follows that there are
only kr (polynomially many) regions Tj . As seen in Theorem 1, to compute a best response, for each
region, we solve a quadratic program over d variables with n(k − 1) linear constraints. Since the
run time of solving a quadratic program is polynomial in the number of variables and constraints
[33], and we are solving only polynomially many programs, the entire run time of computing a best
response is polynomial.
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